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1   Introduction 
How does political decentralization affect the frequency and the costliness of corrupt bribe-extraction by 
officials? Theories suggest conflicting conclusions. On one hand, by bringing officials “closer to the 
people” or encouraging competition among governments for mobile resources, decentralization might 
increase government accountability and discipline. On the other, decentralization could impede 
coordination and exacerbate incentives for officials at different levels to “overgraze” the common bribe 
base. More generally, one might expect a variety of effects associated with different types of 
decentralization to operate simultaneously, pulling in many directions, with different strength in different 
contexts.  
 A number of scholars have sought to answer this question empirically by looking for relationships 
between measures of political or fiscal decentralization and crossnational indexes of perceived corruption 
derived from surveys of risk analysts, businessmen and citizens. In particular, scholars have examined 
perceived corruption ratings produced by Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB), and the 
business consultancy Political Risk Services, which publishes the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The findings of these studies have been mixed and sometimes mutually contradictory.  
 Focusing on fiscal decentralization, Huther and Shah (1998), De Mello and Barenstein (2001), 
Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Arikan (2004) all report that a larger subnational share of public 
expenditures (as measured in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics) was associated with lower 
perceived corruption using the TI, ICRG, or WB indexes. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) do not 
report an unconditional effect, but find that a larger subnational revenue share is associated with lower 
perceived corruption (using WB, but not TI, data) in developing countries with older political parties (and 
vice versa); a larger subnational revenue share in developing countries where there are few parties in 
government is associated with lower corruption (on both WB and TI measures) (and vice versa). Looking 
at political rather than fiscal indicators, Goldsmith (1999), Treisman (2000), and Kunicová and Rose 
Ackerman (2005) all found that federal structure was associated with higher perceived corruption. 
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However, in a more recent review of the empirical literature, Treisman (2007) suggested that neither the 
(negative) expenditure decentralization effect nor the (positive) federalism effect was robust. The fiscal 
decentralization effect was weakened by controlling for national religious traditions, and the federal effect 
disappeared as the number of countries in the sample increased. Treisman (2002) and Arikan (2004) 
explored whether smaller local units were associated with less corruption because of more intense 
interjurisdictional competition, but obtained inconclusive results. Finally, examining the effect of the 
vertical structure of states, Treisman (2002) found that a larger number of administrative or governmental 
tiers correlated with higher perceived corruption, but whether subnational governments were appointed or 
elected did not have a clear effect.  
 In this paper, we advance and improve upon this literature in three ways. First, our analysis exploits 
an original cross-national data set on different varieties of decentralization, compiled from more than 480 
sources. This allows us to design indicators of particular types of decentralization to match the underlying 
logic of specific arguments. We look for relationships between reported experience with corruption and: 
(i) the number of tiers of government or administration in the country (see Section 3.1), (ii) the average 
land area of lowest tier units (see Section 3.2), (iii) several proxies for the extent of subnational political 
decisionmaking (see Section 3.2 and others), (iv) an indicator for whether lower tier units have elected 
executives (see Section 3.3), (v) a measure of subnational tax revenues as a share of GDP (see Section 
3.4), and (vi) an estimate of the share of subnational government personnel in total civilian government 
personnel (see Section 3.5). 
 Second, most previous studies have used perceived corruption indexes that rely on the aggregated 
perceptions of businessmen or country experts, many of whom may have formed impressions—perhaps 
subconsciously—based on common press depictions of countries or conventional notions about what 
institutions or cultures are conducive to corruption. More recently, a second type of data has become 
available: survey responses of businessmen and citizens in particular countries about their own (or close 
associates’) concrete experiences with corrupt officials. In a recent study, Treisman (2007) showed that, 
for developing countries, the perceived corruption indexes were relatively weakly correlated with 
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experience-based indicators. Among countries rated as highly corrupt on the subjective indexes of TI, 
WB, and the ICRG, there is great variation in the level of reported experience with corruption. For 
instance, on the World Bank perceived corruption index, Argentina and Macedonia were both rated about 
equally corrupt in 2000: they were ranked 103 and 114 respectively out of 185 countries. But respondents 
from these two countries gave dramatically different answers when surveyed by the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in the late 1990s about their own personal 
experience with bribery. When asked whether during the previous year “any government official, for 
instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector” had asked or expected them to pay a bribe for his 
services, respondents in Argentina were three and a half times as likely as the Macedonian respondents to 
say yes. While Argentina had the second highest frequency of reported demands for bribes (second only 
to Indonesia), Macedonia was only 24th in the list of 49 countries, about even with South Africa and the 
Czech Republic. Perhaps of greater concern, a number of factors commonly believed to affect corruption 
(democracy, press freedom, oil rents, even the percentage of women in government) do an excellent job 
explaining the cross-national varietion in the subjective corruption indexes (R-squareds approaching .90). 
But the same factors are mostly uncorrelated with the frequency or scale of self-reported experiences with 
corruption once one controls for income. One cannot help wondering if the businessmen and experts 
whose perceptions are being tapped might be inferring corruption levels from its hypothesized causes.  
 In this study, we explore the results of an experience-based survey of business managers conducted 
in 80 countries. The World Business Environment Survey interviewed managers from more than 9,000 
firms in 1999-2000. We focus on two questions. Respondents were asked: “Is it common for firms in your 
line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ to get things done?” and “On 
average, what percent of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts 
to public officials?” The first question provides an indicator of the frequency of bribery, while the second 
aims to estimate its scale. The relationship between the proportion of respondents that said irregular 
payments were expected “always”, “mostly”, or “frequently”, and the World Bank’s subjective index of 
perceived corruption for the year 2000 are graphed in Figure 1. It is interesting to note that while 
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businessmen in France and Brazil gave very similar responses to this question (about 27 percent saying 
bribes were expected “always”, “mostly”, or “frequently”), France is rated as among the least corrupt 
countries on the World Bank’s index, while Brazil is perceived to have much higher corruption. Of 
course, no approach is completely without problems; it is possible that questions that focus more closely 
on managers’ direct experience with corruption might not be answered with complete frankness for fear 
of some kind of self-incrimination. However, we believe this danger is less serious than the danger that 
bias will creep into the assessments of “experts” and foreign businessmen because of inconsistencies in 
media coverage. (As a robustness check, we compare our results to those obtained using the traditional 
perceived corruption data.)  
[Figure 1 here] 
 Third, besides permitting us to focus on experience-based rather than subjective indicators of 
corruption, the WBES makes it possible to control better for individual characteristics of survey respondents 
(which vary systematically across countries). Specifically, we can control for the size, ownership structure, 
investment level, and level of exports of firms in analyzing their managers’ responses on corruption.  
 In the next section, we briefly introduce the decentralization data used in the paper. We review common 
arguments about the consequences of decentralization for governance in section 3, and in section 4 discuss the 
corruption data and controls. We then look for evidence of the hypothesized effects in the WBES. In Section 
5 we present empirical results and discuss robustness tests. Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
 
2   A new data set on governance in multi-level states 
Previous work has often used measures of fiscal decentralization or simple dummies for federal structure to 
proxy for various other types or dimensions of political and administrative decentralization. The data set 
introduced here permits a more fine-grained analysis. It contains measures of various characteristics of 
multi-level states as of the mid-1990s, based on information from more than 480 sources.1  
                                                 
1 These data and the full list of sources will be made available on the corresponding author’s web site. 
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 A first dimension is simply the number of tiers of government or administration. Our data set contains 
information on this for 156 countries. We coded a level of administration as a “tier” if there existed a state 
executive body at that level which met three conditions: (1) it was funded from the public budget, (2) it had 
authority to administer a range of public services, and (3) it had a territorial jurisdiction. This definition 
includes both bodies with decisionmaking autonomy and those that are essentially administrative agents of 
higher level governments. On this measure, Singapore as of the mid-1990s had just one tier, while Uganda 
had six.  
 Multi-level states differ also in the number and size of their lowest-tier units. This is relevant, for 
instance, to arguments about interjurisdictional mobility. The data set contains estimates of the number of 
bottom level units (BOTTOM UNITS), and the “average” area of these (BOTTOM SIZE), calculated by simply 
dividing the country’s area by the number of units.2 While Guyana in the mid-1990s had just six incorporated 
towns, India had some 235,000 lower tier village governments. The average area of the lowest tier units 
ranged from 2.2 square kilometers in Bangladesh to 83 square kilometers in Botswana. 
 Perhaps most important, multi-level governments differ in how authority is divided among the various 
tiers. Measuring the degree of decisionmaking autonomy of local governments in a systematic way is 
notoriously difficult. Our data set contains a simple dummy (AUTONOMY), which records for 133 countries 
whether the constitution assigned at least one policy area exclusively to subnational governments or gave 
subnational governments exclusive authority to legislate on matters not constitutionally assigned to any level. 
This variable is less than ideal. For one thing, informal behavior often diverges from what is written in the 
constitution. In some countries—Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, for instance—it seems unlikely the 
constitutional provisions are scrupulously observed.3 Yet determining the degree of actual decisionmaking 
decentralization in any country is inescapably subjective. Experts often disagree with regard to a single 
country, let alone agreeing on crossnational comparisons. At the same time, the number and relative 
                                                 
2 A better variable would be the average area of all actual units, but data were not available. Since the number of 
bottom-tier units changes over time as units split or combine, the variable is only a rough indicator.  
 
3 Both inherited Soviet-era internal “autonomous republics”, whose rights are constitutionally protected.  
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importance of policy areas constitutionally assigned to subnational governments differs, and there is no 
obvious way to add these up. AUTONOMY also focuses mostly on intermediate levels—states, provinces, or 
regions—whereas the governments most relevant to questions of interregional competition will often be at the 
local level. We supplement the use of AUTONOMY in our analysis with several other indicators of 
decisionmaking decentralization available from other data sets and sources.4 
 To capture differences in the extent of local electoral accountability, we constructed two variables. The 
first (BOTTOM TIER ELECTION) focuses on the mode of selection of the chief executive of the bottom tier 
government, while the second (SECOND LOWEST TIER ELECTION) focuses on the executive at the next 
highest tier. Each of these takes the value 1 if the executives at the relevant tier were (as of the mid-1990s) 
directly elected or chosen by a directly elected local assembly, and 0 if the executives were appointed by 
higher level officials. They take the value 0.5 if some chief executives were appointed while others were 
elected.  
 Details of the variables and the correlations between them and some other common decentralization 
indicators are shown in Tables 1 and 2. While we focus on the impact of political decentralization on 
corruption in this study, the political decentralization measures introduced here could be used to examine the 
effects of decentralization on various other aspects of government performance such as service quality, 
provision of public goods, and tax collection.  
 [Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
 
3   Decentralization and corruption: theory 
Political or fiscal decentralization might affect the quality of government in various ways. We discuss  
                                                 
4 Our definition of AUTONOMY is close to various classic definitions of federalism. Riker (1964) defines states as 
“federal” if: (1) they have (at least) two levels of government, and (2) each level has “at least one area of action in 
which it is autonomous.” The latter requirement must be formally guaranteed, for instance in a constitution (Riker 
1964, p.11). This is close to Robert Dahl’s definition of federalism as “a system in which some matters are 
exclusively within the competence of certain local units—cantons, states, provinces—and are constitutionally 
beyond the scope of the authority of the national government; and where certain other matters are constitutionally 
outside the scope of the authority of the smaller units” (Dahl 1986, quoted in Stepan 2001, p.318; italics in original). 
In our operationalization, AUTONOMY is a broader category because we assign a “1” also to countries that devolve 
decisionmaking rights to certain selected regions but not to others.  
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here a number of arguments made in previous work, specifying to which type of decentralization each 
applies. We do not expect most to be fully general, and some could operate simultaneously or offset each 
other in complicated ways.   
 
3.1   Vertical competition 
Governments can use the power to regulate to extract bribes from firms or citizens. If the bribe rate is set too 
high, this will discourage firms or citizens from producing wealth, reducing the amount of revenue actually 
extracted. Thus, a unitary predatory government will moderate its demands. However, if multiple officials 
regulate the same actors and fail to coordinate, they may set the total bribe rate higher than would be optimal 
for a unitary, bribe-maximizing government (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Indeed, the aggregate bribe burden is 
likely to increase with the number of independent regulators. If officials at each tier in a multi-level state can 
regulate, the burden of bribery should increase with the number of tiers. The logic is that of “double 
marginalization” under vertical integration (Spengler 1950) or “overgrazing” in taxation (Keen and 
Kotsogiannis 2002, Berkowitz and Li 2000).5 
 Although appealing, this argument might fail for various reasons. The number of independent 
regulators might not increase with the number of tiers. In fact, administrative complexity at the center and 
decentralization might be substitutes—to govern directly, a central government may need to create more 
agencies in the capital to take the place of local field agents. Moreover, career concerns might motivate local 
officials in a decentralized state to behave honestly. The hope of rising to higher office may cause local 
officials to cultivate a reputation for integrity (Myerson 2006). Finally, if elected governments at different 
levels provide comparable public goods, some scholars suggest they may be disciplined by yardstick 
competition. Voters can use the performance of each as a benchmark to judge the efficiency of the other 
(Salmon 1987, Breton 1996, p.189). If one government over-regulates in order to extract bribes, its 
                                                 
5 In a notable recent contribution, Olken and Barron (2007) find evidence consistent with double-marginalization 
using Indonesian data. 
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performance will look bad in comparison to its more liberal counterparts at other levels. To test this argument, 
we use the variable TIERS, measuring the number of levels of government or administration.   
 
3.2   Interregional competition 
 
If capital or labor is mobile and local governments choose policies, they may tailor these to attract the mobile 
factor (Hayek 1939, Tiebout 1956). Officials who steal or waste resources will lose residents and businesses 
to other regions, reducing their tax base. If they over-regulate in order to extract bribes, firms will flee to 
lower-regulation settings. In this way, interjurisdictional competition may discipline local governments, 
reducing corruption and causing them to supply public goods efficiently (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; 
Montinola et al. 1995). The impact of such competition should be greater, the lower the cost of moving 
between units; moving costs should increase with the size of the units. 
 However, the fear of losing mobile capital may fail to discipline local governments for a number of 
reasons (e.g., Cai and Treisman 2005). Or governments may compete to attract capital by promising corrupt 
benefits to local businesses at the expense of the central government (Cai and Treisman 2004). Even if 
interjurisdictional competition motivates local politicians to reduce corruption, it does not increase their 
capacity to do so. If most bribes are taken by local bureaucrats and anti-corruption measures must be 
implemented by the same bureaucrats, it may matter little how motivated the politicians are to clean up 
government. And if anti-corruption measures are costly, the inability to tax mobile capital may make it harder 
for local governments to fund such efforts.  
 The relevant type of decentralization here is devolution of decisionmaking about regulation or taxation 
to subnational levels; among countries with a similar level of such devolution, one might expect a positive 
correlation between average size of the subnational units and corruption. To measure devolution of 
decisionmaking, we start with the variable AUTONOMY. But we supplement it with various alternatives. 
First, we created a dummy for whether the country was classified as “federal” by a leading expert on 
federalism as of the mid-1990s (FEDERAL) (Elazar 1995). Second, in an attempt at a more fine-grained 
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analysis, we tried using measures of the extent of decisionmaking decentralization in specific public service 
areas, constructed by Henderson (2000). Henderson coded whether, in 49 countries in 1960-95, authority for 
primary education, local highway construction, and local policing belonged to the central, regional, or local 
governments, or some combination of the three.6 (Of these 49 countries, 35 were included in the WBES.) 
Both local road construction and local policing could impinge on the operations of almost any business, but it 
is harder to see how the regulation of primary schooling could lend itself to widespread extraction of bribes 
from businesses, so we focused on the former two indicators. We constructed two variables (ROADS LOCAL 
and POLICE LOCAL) which took the value 1 if, as of 1995, the local governments participated in 
decisionmaking on the issue in question, and 0 otherwise.7 The arguments in Section 3.2 suggest that when 
ROADS LOCAL and/or POLICE LOCAL equal one, greater factor mobility might be associated with lower 
corruption. To capture the average size of subnational units, which should be positively related to moving 
costs, we used our variable BOTTOM SIZE.      
 
3.3   Electoral accountability 
 
For several reasons, holding elections at the local level rather than just the center might increase the 
accountability of government (see e.g. Seabright 1996). First, voters might have better information about local 
than about central government performance. Second, whereas national elections focus on government 
performance nationwide, local elections can focus more specifically on performance in each region. Third, 
dividing up responsibilities among several levels of elected government might make it easier for voters to 
attribute credit or blame among them (under decentralization, one can vote for an honest central government 
                                                 
6 The details of the data set constructed by Henderson (2000) can be obtained through direct communications with 
Henderson. 
 
7 In only one case—local highway construction in Uganda—did the local governments enjoy exclusive authority. 
We also constructed an indicator (SHARED RESPONSIBILITY) for the number of government levels participating in 
decisionmaking in these two policy areas (the more governments involved, the greater the potential for predatory 
extraction and “overgrazing”). Values ranged from 2 if for both local highways and policing only one level could 
make policy (as in Syria or Egypt), to 6 if, for both areas, all three levels of government could participate (as in the 
US). From the arguments in Section 3.1, one might expect SHARED RESPONSIBILITY to correlate positively with 
corruption. In fact, it was never significant, so we do not show results including it. 
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and against a corrupt local government rather than having to vote for or against the team as a whole).8 Fourth, 
the smaller a unit’s electorate, the easier it should be for voters to coordinate on a voting strategy to discipline 
the incumbent.  
 Questions can be raised about each of these arguments. First, local corruption can be concealed at least 
as well as central corruption, and watchdog groups and investigative journalists tend to devote more resources 
to monitoring national government since the stakes are generally higher. Second, voters evaluate incumbents 
on multiple dimensions and it is not clear whether corruption will be more salient in local or in national 
elections. Even if voters voted on just the corruption question, competition in a national election should often 
motivate central candidates to fight corruption in each district (if they do not, their adversary will, winning 
votes in the affected unit). Third, dividing responsibilities among levels may muddle rather than clarify the 
attribution of responsibility (compare a system in which two levels share responsibility for all policy areas to 
one in which a central government is alone responsible for all). Finally, coordinating is only significantly 
easier in groups that are very small (and smaller than the electorates of most existing local districts). Even in 
tiny villages, there are many dimensions on which voters could judge local officials, rendering coordination to 
discipline them on corruption problematic.9 To capture differences in the extent of local electoral 
accountability, we used the variables BOTTOM TIER ELECTION and SECOND LOWEST TIER ELECTION. 
 
3.4   Fiscal incentives 
The greater is corruption, the lower will be the motivation of firms to produce. Given this, some argue 
that corruption will fall if local officials are given a large personal stake in local economic activity. Under 
tax-sharing systems, the larger the share local governments retain of marginal tax revenues, the lower 
                                                 
8 Besley and Coate (2003) make a similar argument about why direct election of regulators—rather than their 
appointment by elected officials—might lead to greater responsiveness to voters by reducing the number of issues 
on which each vote is cast.  
 
9 Electoral decentralization also eliminates accountability of local officials to voters outside their unit, which 
might itself increase some kinds of corruption. A locally elected sheriff could increase his town’s revenues, taking 
a cut for himself, by inaccurately citing out-of-town motorists for speeding.  
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should be their incentive to extract bribes (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995, Zhuravskaya 2000, Jin et 
al. 2005). Since the argument relates to the marginal rate at which local governments benefit from 
increased local business activity, the relevant variable is the local governments’ revenue as a share of 
local income at the margin. As usual, there are caveats. Increasing local governments’ share means 
decreasing the shares of other levels. If local governments become more motivated to support economic 
performance, governments at other levels should become less motivated. Since, for better or worse, 
governments at all levels influence economic performance, the resulting net effect is indeterminate 
(Treisman 2006). Moreover, local officials may derive greater utility from bribe revenue, which they can 
spend at will, than from increased revenue officially received by the local budget, which may be costly to 
embezzle. If officials are already constrained by the risk of detection from embezzling more, then 
increasing the local tax share may not make them want to reduce their bribe taking in order to expand the 
local budget.  
 To test this argument, we use subnational government revenues as a percentage of GDP. The data 
are mostly from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (as collected in the World Bank’s 
database of fiscal decentralization indicators), supplemented by additional sources on specific countries. 
We took the average value for all available years between 1994 and 2000. There are some missing 
observations in this variable so the sample size falls from 67 countries (6,676 observations) to 54 
countries (5,598 observations) when we include it. Some previous studies used a variable measuring the 
share of local revenues or expenditures in total public revenues or expenditures to look for the effects of 
fiscal decentralization. However, since the argument here concerns the share of local income that local 
governments retain through taxation, we prefer an indicator that measures this more closely—the share of 
local revenues in GDP.  
 A better variable would have been the marginal revenue rate for local governments from locally 
generated income; however, cross-national data on marginal rates were not available, so we had to use the 
average rate instead. We control in these regressions for total government revenues as a share of GDP, 
since larger government might be associated with both greater corruption and higher local taxation.  
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3.5   Local collusion 
Some economists suggest local officials are simply more susceptible to corruption than their central 
counterparts, perhaps because they have more opportunities for face-to-face interactions with businessmen 
(e.g., Prud’homme 1995, Tanzi 1995, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000) Local press and citizen groups may be 
weaker—and more subject to intimidation or cooptation—than at the center. Interest groups may be more 
cohesive at the local level, leading to greater state capture. By this logic, government should be more corrupt, 
the greater the share of government personnel located at subnational levels.   
 However, one could also argue the opposite. Even if the intimacy of interaction and the cohesiveness of 
interest groups are greater at the local level, the potential kickbacks and payoffs in national politics are likely 
to be higher. As noted in Section 3.3, voters are often assumed to be better informed about their local 
governments than about politics in the nation’s capital. In any case, the real question is not whether local 
governments are likely to be more corrupt than central governments but whether elected local governments 
with decisionmaking power are likely to be more or less corrupt than centrally appointed local agents with 
more restricted authority. Whether there is a general answer to this question is unclear. To test this argument, 
we constructed a measure of government personnel decentralization—the subnational share in total civilian 
government employees as of the mid-1990s, as estimated by Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997). We control for 
total government employment as a share of the labor force, since, as noted, the size of government as a whole 
might itself be related to corruption.  
 
4   Corruption data and controls 
4.1   The survey 
The WBES was conducted in 1999 and 2000 by a team from the World Bank. Managers from over 9,000 
firms in more than 80 countries were surveyed with a standard questionnaire.10 The main purpose was to 
identify the driving factors behind and obstacles to enterprises’ performance and growth around the world. 
                                                 
10 For more information on the survey, see http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes.  
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The questionnaire touched on many aspects of firms’ operations, including corruption, regulation, and the 
institutional environment. The firms surveyed varied in size (including a large number of small and 
medium-size enterprises), ownership (both public and private), industrial sector, and organizational structure. 
Because of missing firm-level and decentralization variables, the number of firms we could include in our 
analysis starts at about 6,700 (from 67 countries), and falls lower as additional variables are added. Previous 
work has used the WBES data to study such outcomes as firm growth, investment flows, the effects of 
institutions, property rights, and corruption (Hellman, Kaufman, and Schankerman, 2000; Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2006; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2007, Barth, Lin, 
Lin and Song, 2008). According to Reinikka and Svensson (2006, p.367), the WBES shows that “with 
appropriate survey methods and interview techniques, it is possible to collect quantitative data on corruption 
at the micro-level.” 
 
4.2   Measures of corruption 
We constructed two measures of corruption using WBES data. The first, which we call BRIBE 
FREQUENCY, is based on a question in which respondents were asked: “Is it common for firms in your 
line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ to get things done.” The interviewers 
assured respondents that their responses would be kept completely confidential, and that their names and 
the names of their firms would never be identified in any publication or survey document. In addition, to 
encourage honest responses, the question asked only about unofficial payments “in your line of business” 
rather than those “paid by your firm” (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Managers could choose 
between six responses: 1 (never), 2 (seldom), 3 (sometimes), 4 (frequently), 5 (usually), and 6 (always). 
Thus, the variable BRIBE FREQUENCY takes these six values; a larger value represents more frequent 
bribery payments.11 Overall, about 69 percent of respondents (6,300 out of 9,130) reported that firms like 
theirs paid bribes to public officials to get things done. About 15 percent of the firms reported that this 
                                                 
11 The original survey offered the six choices in reverse order: (1) always, (2) mostly, (3) frequently, (4) sometimes, 
(5) seldom, (6) never. We recoded the variable to make the empirical results more intuitive. 
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occurred “4 ( frequently),” 12 percent reported “5 (usually),” and 9 percent reported “6 (always)”. In 
countries such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, more than 90 percent 
of the firms sampled reported that such unofficial payments occurred at least occasionally. The lowest 
rate of reported bribery was in Singapore, where 90 percent said firms like theirs never had to make 
unofficial payments.  
 Our second measure, which we call BRIBE AMOUNT, was constructed from a question that asked: 
“On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials?” The survey offered seven choices: (1) 0 percent, (2) 0-1 percent, (3) 
1-1.99 percent, (4) 2-9.99 percent, (5) 10-12 percent, (6) 13-25 percent, and (7) over 25 percent. Out of 
the original sample of 80 countries, respondents in 60 countries answered this question. Overall, more 
than 62 percent of those who responded reported that firms like theirs typically made positive unofficial 
payments to public officials. More than 38 percent reported that such payments were greater than 1 
percent of total sales; about 11 percent said payments exceeded 10 percent of total sales. The average size 
of such payments varied across both countries and the firms within them.   
 The two measures of corruption are complementary, capturing different dimensions that may not 
always coincide (bribes could be frequent but tiny, or rare but large). In some respects, the amount of 
bribes paid is the more interesting variable. However, it was also apparently perceived by respondents as 
more sensitive: in one quarter of the countries, respondents did not answer this question. By contrast, the 
response rate for the first question was high: the only country in which none answered the question was 
China, and the response rate ranged from 63 percent in Senegal to 100 percent in the Philippines and 
Thailand, with an average of 92 percent.12 Consequently, our regressions of BRIBE FREQUENCY can 
include a larger range of countries than those for BRIBE AMOUNT. As will become clear, our results 
using the two variables are very similar and complementary.  
                                                 
12 In order to further explore the potential issue of non-randomly missing responses, we created a truncated sample 
from which all the firms that were missing observations on any of the following key variables were excluded: 
corruption frequency, firm size, government ownership, foreign ownership and exporting status. We then compared 
the truncated sample to the full sample for the same firm characteristics. (Since many were missing data on just one 
of these, the full sample could differ substantially from the truncated sample.) In all cases, the differences between 
the truncated sample and full sample were not statistically significant. We also tried dropping some countries with 
relatively high missing response rates (e.g. Senegal) from the sample and found the empirical results highly robust. 
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 The WBES also asked respondents about the particular contexts in which bribes were demanded. 
Specifically, it asked whether “firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
public officials for any of the following purposes…” and listed six possibilities: “to get connected to 
public services (electricity, telephone), to get licenses and permits, to deal with taxes and tax collection, to 
gain government contracts, when dealing with customs/imports, and when dealing with courts”. For each 
of these, respondents could choose from six answers: 1 (never), 2 (seldom), 3 (sometimes), 4 (frequently), 
5 (usually), and 6 (always). We constructed variables for the first five (Public Services, Business License, 
Tax Collection, Government Contract, and Customs, respectively), and repeated our analysis to see if 
decentralization had different effects on corruption in these different settings. We did not expect to find 
similar results for corruption of the courts, since the arguments that apply to executive officials fit less 
well in this case. As a check to increase confidence that some unobserved third factor is not driving the 
results, we also ran regressions for the courts variable, and show that the results for executive officials do 
not extend to the courts.  
 
4.3   Firm-level control variables 
In our regressions, we include dummy variables for firms’ ownership. The variable State Ownership 
equals 1 if any government agency or state body has a financial stake in ownership of the firm, 0 
otherwise. Foreign Ownership equals 1 if a foreign company or individual has a financial stake in  
ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise. The excluded category consists of firms completely owned by 
domestic private businesses or individuals. We expect that private firms are more vulnerable to bribe 
demands because they tend to have fewer government connections, less political influence, and weaker 
bargaining power (Svensson 2003). We also control for whether the given enterprise is an exporter 
(Exporter equals 1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise) and for the enterprise’s size (Firm Size equals the 
natural logarithm of firm sales). Finally, we include industry classification dummies (for manufacturing, 




4.4   Country-level control variables 
Previous studies have found certain aspects of countries’ economic structure, institutions, and culture to 
be significantly related to indicators of perceived corruption. La Porta et al. (1999), Ades and Di Tella 
(1999), Svensson (2005), and many others found robust evidence that higher GDP per capita was 
associated with lower perceived corruption. Treisman (2000) reported that Protestant religion, a history of 
British rule, and a long exposure to democracy were significantly linked to lower perceived corruption. 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) found that corruption was perceived to be greater in countries with large 
endowments of valuable natural resources (e.g. fuel and minerals) and in those that were less open to 
trade. Following previous practice, we control for the logarithm of countries’ GDP per capita (GDP per 
Capita), imports of goods and services as a share of GDP (Imports), democracy in all years between 1950 
and 2000 (Democratic), status as a former British colony (British Colony), share of minerals and fuels in 
manufacturing exports (Fuel), and the proportion of Protestants in the population (Protestant). To check 
for robustness, we try also including the number of years the country had been open to trade, a variable 
for presidential system, and an index of press freedom constructed by Freedom House. The empirical 
results were very robust to including these variables.13 Table 3 provides brief descriptions of the variables 
and data sources. Table 4 presents summary statistics.  
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
5   Results 
5.1   Basic models 
We estimate two sets of regressions, one using the dependent variable BRIBE FREQUENCY, the other 
using BRIBE AMOUNT. In each case, we assume the enterprise’s latent response can be described as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
13 For brevity, we do not report these results here; both the number of years open to trade and the press freedom 
index were significantly associated with lower corruption. 
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where , , ,{  ,   }i j i j i jDEPVAR BRIBE FREQUENCY BRIBE AMOUNT . The i and j subscripts indicate firm 
and country, respectively. Unlike the latent variable, the observed dependent variables, BRIBE 
FREQUENCY i,j and BRIBE AMOUNT i,j , are polychotomous variables with a natural order. Specifically, 
the respondent classifies the frequency of informal payments or the total burden of bribes into 6 or 7 
categories, with 5 or 6 threshold parameters, s ; s is the number of the thresholds. We therefore use the 
ordered probit model to estimate the  -parameters together with regression coefficients simultaneously. 
We use the standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In 
addition, we cluster the standard errors by country, allowing the errors to be correlated across firms within 
the same country while still requiring them to be independent across countries14. The coefficients are the 
same but more significant when we do not allow for clustering and simply run a standard ordered probit 
under the assumption of independent observations.  
 We start by running a regression that just includes the number of tiers. We then run regressions for 
the other explanatory variables associated with particular arguments discussed in Section 3. In all of 
these, we control for the number of tiers since the way the distribution of powers and resources across 
tiers affects corruption is very likely to depend on the number of tiers. Finally, we show a model that 
combines all the statistically significant decentralization variables into an aggregate regression.15 
Significance naturally decreases as more decentralization variables are included because some of the 
measures are correlated. We present the results in Tables 5 and 6. Note that the number of observations 
falls in the regressions for BRIBE AMOUNT because of the higher non-response rate. Since enterprises in 
                                                 
14 Estimation with a very small number of clusters may cause potential problems in estimating standard errors. For 
instance, if the number of clusters is far less than the number of regressors in the model, the insufficient degrees of 
freedom may produce singular cluster-corrected covariance matrices of the coefficient estimates. In our models, the 
number of clusters is greater than 30 in most cases, so this should be less of a concern.  
 
15 That is, excluding the Henderson measures of policy decentralization, since these are available for far fewer 
countries and would cause a sharp drop in the number of observations.  
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only 60 out of the 80 countries reported bribery payment amounts, the sample size falls from more than 
6,000 to about 4,000.  
 Ordered probit coefficients do not simply measure the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable on the dependent variable (although the signs and statistical significance of the 
coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as for linear regression). To give a sense of the size of the 
estimated effects, we compute the marginal impact of increased decentralization on the probabilities that 
respondents choose each of the six categories (from “never” to “always”), and show these in Table 7. For 
this, we use the coefficient estimates from a model that includes all the independent variables found to be 
significant in sparser regressions. Given the correlations between different decentralization indicators, this 
is a relatively conservative approach.   
[Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
 A first finding concerns the vertical structure of the state. Among firms in this survey, those located 
in countries with more administrative or governmental tiers reported that firms like theirs were expected 
to pay bribes more frequently and for larger amounts than did those in countries with a flatter government 
structure (Table 5). The coefficient on TIERS was significant in almost all regressions. The size of the 
effect of TIERS on corruption was also quite large. For instance, adding an additional tier increased the 
probability that a firm from that country “always needed to make informal payments to get things done” 
by 2.6 percentage points and decreased the probability that firms “never” had to make such payments by 
6.7 percentage points (Table 7). These effects are quite substantial given that only about nine percent of 
respondents said firms like theirs always made such payments and about 33 percent said they never did. 
The burden of bribery also appeared to be higher in countries with more tiers (Table 6). Bearing in mind 
the reduced country coverage in these regressions, the estimates nevertheless suggest that more tiers are 
associated with larger bribery payments.  
[Table 7 here] 
 The number of tiers remains significant after adding more decentralization measures (e.g. fiscal 
decentralization, personnel decentralization, local autonomy) and control variables to the model in most 
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specifications. Does the effect rise uniformly with the number of tiers or is there a threshold level of 
vertical complexity at which corruption increases? To examine this we broke down the tiers variable into 
separate dummies for “more than 1 tier,” “more than 2 tiers” and so on. The results (not presented here 
for lack of space) showed that countries with 5 or 6 tiers had significantly more reported corruption than 
those with 3 or 4 tiers, which were, in turn, significantly more corrupt than those with 1 or 2 tiers.  
 These results parallel those found for indexes of perceived corruption by Treisman (2002). Although 
we hesitate to generalize beyond the sample given the non-random way in which countries were included 
(based on the availability of information on relevant variables), this does provide support for arguments 
that emphasize the problems of coordination and overgrazing in multi-tier structures. 
 The argument in Section 3.2 suggested that, conditional on some decisionmaking autonomy at the 
lowest tier, corruption should be less frequent and costly when the bottom units are smaller. Thus, we 
looked for interaction effects between local autonomy and bottom tier size. We controlled for bottom unit 
size, since it could have a direct impact on corruption. Using the general measures of subnational 
autonomy—federal structure, subnational decisionmaking rights—we found no statistically significant 
effect of bottom tier size. Using Henderson’s measure of local authority over road construction, we found 
a surprising negative effect of bottom unit size: among those states where local governments participated 
in road construction, corruption was more frequent when the bottom units were smaller. This goes against 
the expectation that local governments would be more fearful of driving away businesses when units are 
smaller. It is possible that in larger local units, the rent-seeking of bureaucrats is more coordinated and 
this effect reduces corruption more than the disciplining effect of small jurisdiction size.  
 A third main finding concerns fiscal decentralization. In countries where subnational government 
revenues amounted to a larger share of GDP, firms reported less frequent demands for bribes, at least 
controlling for the number of tiers and total government revenue. A one standard deviation increase in 
subnational revenue as a share of GDP was associated with a 3 percentage point drop in the probability 
that firms would “always” have to make unofficial payments to get things done, along with a 7.7 
percentage point increase in the probability that firms “never” have to make such payments (Table 7). 
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This does provide some prima facie evidence that giving local governments a larger stake in tax revenues 
may reduce their incentive to demand bribes.16 
 However, there is reason to be cautious in interpreting this result. There was no evidence that the 
burden of bribery was lower in countries where subnational revenues were higher (coefficients were not 
significant in these regressions—see Table 6).17 And, interestingly, the reported frequency of bribery was 
also significantly lower in countries where central government revenues added up to a larger share of 
GDP holding subnational revenue constant.18 Larger central government revenues were linked not just to 
less frequent bribery but to a lower reported cost in bribes as well. Thus, one might read this as evidence 
of the beneficial incentive effect of giving governments at any level a greater stake in local revenue 
generation. We will return to this in discussing results for bribery in particular public services. However, 
there is also another interpretation. The level of revenue collection is clearly endogenous. It might be that 
excessive bribe extraction reduces government’s ability to collect taxes, whether to fund subnational or 
central budgets. Larger government would then be a result of low corruption, not a cause of it. Lacking 
any reliable instruments, we can not rule out this alternative.  
 Some evidence supported the idea that greater decentralization of government personnel facilitates 
corruption. We found that a larger share of public employment at subnational levels was significantly 
associated with more frequent bribery, and the effect was larger controlling for the level of local revenues. 
Greater personnel decentralization was also associated with a greater burden of bribery (Table 6), 
although this result became insignificant when more decentralization variables were included.19 We also 
used an alternative personnel decentralization measure—the number of subnational employees per 
capita—since what matters for corruption may be the ratio of local officials to local residents. This, too, 
                                                 
16 In Fan, Lin and Treisman (2008) we tried some other commonly-used fiscal decentralization measures (i.e. 
subnational tax revenue as a percentage of total tax revenue and subnational government expenditure as a percentage 
of total government expenditure), and we found the subnational revenue share to be negatively and statistically 
significantly associated with the frequency of corruption, but the subnational expenditure share was not significant.  
 
17 Besides, in regressions that do not control for the number of tiers, subnational revenues are not significantly 
related to the frequency of bribery and are even significantly positively related to the bribery amount.  
 
18 Holding the subnational revenues constant, the total revenues variable picks up the effect of central revenues.  
 
19 These regressions also controlled for total public employment as a share of the labor force.  
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was significant, suggesting that higher staff levels in local government correlate with more frequent 
corruption (Tables 5 and 6, column 9).   
Other measures of decentralization—federal structure, subnational autonomy, elections at bottom 
and second lowest tiers—had no statistically significant impact on corruption.20 For the indicators of 
policymaking decentralization, this could, of course, result from the imprecision of the measures we were 
able to construct. The lack of evidence that local elections reduced bribery might reflect the 
counter-effects suggested in Section 3.3. Local elections may be manipulated by local elites; voters may 
be ill-informed or intimidated; or voters may choose to vote on other issues or fail to coordinate to throw 
corrupt incumbents out of office. In some centralized countries, national elections may effectively 
motivate central incumbents to discipline their local agents. At the same time, deadlock and 
burden-shifting between elected central and local officials may enable all levels to shirk responsibility for 
poor governance.21 
The firm and country control variables also yield some interesting results. In all specifications, 
state-owned firms were less likely than their privately-owned counterparts to pay bribes, and the amount 
they reported paying was significantly lower. Other things equal, state-owned firms were 4.7 percentage 
points less likely than domestic private firms to say they “always” needed to make unofficial payments, 
and 20 percentage points more likely to say they “never” needed to do so. The coefficients on foreign 
ownership were negative and statistically significant in 6 out of 9 models for the frequency of bribery 
(although usually not significant for the amount of bribery), suggesting a corruption-reducing effect of 
foreign ownership, although a much smaller one than for state ownership. These results are consistent 
with the view that firms with more government connections and bargaining power are less vulnerable to 
predatory bribe-extraction. Larger firms also appeared to pay a smaller percentage of revenues in bribes, 
which might mean that officials tend to charge lump sum amounts in bribes for services rather than to 
                                                 
 
20 The coefficient on our dummy for bottom tier elections was actually positive, although not significant at 
conventional levels.  
 
21 This result is consistent with Olken (2007), who found that increasing grassroots participation in monitoring the 
expenditures of road projects in Indonesian villages had little impact on corruption. 
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levy payments proportional to firm income. Some of the country controls found significant in studies of 
perceived corruption indexes were also significant here. Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita 
reported less exposure to bribery. Measures of trade openness, raw materials exports, and Protestant 
religious tradition were also significant on occasion, but not at all robustly.  
 
5.2   Robustness checks and further exploration 
We checked the robustness of the findings in several ways. 
 First, we split the sample into countries that were relatively more developed (GDP per capita above 
the sample median of $5,995) and those that were less developed (GDP per capita below the sample 
median). In richer countries, which tend to have more sophisticated legal environments, public officials 
may be constrained by mechanisms other than those associated with decentralized institutions. We might 
expect the impact of political decentralization to be stronger in the developing countries. As Table 8  
(columns 1 to 6) shows, this was true for the number of tiers of government, which had a consistently 
significant positive impact on corruption in the less developed countries, but none in the more developed 
ones. Whereas our measures of policymaking decentralization were not significant in regressions for the 
full sample, subnational autonomy was now significantly associated with more frequent corruption in the 
subsample of less developed countries.  
 However, in other respects decentralization appeared to have significant effects in both more and less 
developed countries. Specifically, larger subnational revenues (as a percent of GDP) were associated with 
less frequent bribery in both subsamples. The corruption-increasing effect of greater local public 
employment (given subnational revenues) was also statistically significant in both subsamples. In 
addition, some corruption-reducing effects of centralization seemed to be stronger among the poorer 
countries. Larger central revenues (as a percent of GDP) significantly reduced corruption in the poorer, 
but not the richer, countries. (Recall, however, that causality might run from lower corruption to higher 
central revenues, rather than the reverse.) And, in contrast to the previous results, a larger central 
government bureaucracy was accompanied by less frequent bribery in the developing countries.  
[Table 8 here] 
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 We then split the sample into “high” average corruption and “low” average corruption based on the 
sample median to see if the results are mainly driven by the variation among highly corrupt countries (see 
Table 8, columns 7-12). The main difference is that the number of tiers has a statistically significant effect 
only in the more corrupt sub-sample. Although local autonomy was not statistically significant in the full 
sample, it is significant--suggesting greater local autonomy is linked to more frequent bribery—in each of 
the subsamples. This effect is, in both subsamples, attenuated by the bottom unit size. Higher subnational 
revenues reduce corruption, and higher subnational government employment increases it, in both 
subsamples. Total government employment, which, controlling for the subnational employment share, 
picks up the effect of central government employment, was associated with lower corruption just among 
the more corrupt countries.  
 The fact that we do not have a balanced distribution of responses across the possible answers 
regarding corruption frequency might invalidate the ordered probit estimates; at the same time, a few 
outliers in one of the categories with a small number of responses might disproportionately influence the 
results. One technique used in previous studies to avoid these problems is to construct a corruption 
dummy that takes the value 0 for responses “never” “seldom” and “sometimes” and 1 for “frequently”, 
“mostly,” and “always” (Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al. 2008). We do the same, and show the results in 
Table 9. 
 [Table 9 here] 
In order to show the effects more directly, we calculate and report the marginal effects of the 
coefficients evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the Probit regressions. As can be 
seen in Table 9, the empirical results are very similar to our previous findings using ordered probit 
models. Specifically, the number of government tiers and the subnational share in government 
employment are positively associated with the likelihood of more pervasive corruption; larger bottom unit 
size and fiscal decentralization are associated with a likelihood of less pervasive corruption. Personnel 
decentralization is positively associated with the likelihood of more pervasive corruption, as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient of subnational employment share.   
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Finally, we examined how frequently respondents said bribery was required for particular purposes.   
We ran separate regressions for the reported frequency of bribery needed to: (1) get licenses and permits, 
(2) deal with taxes and tax collection, (3) obtain government contracts, (4) get connected to public 
utilities, (5) deal with customs/imports, and (6) deal with courts (see Table 10).  
[Table 10 here] 
Several conclusions emerge from this exploration. First, the corruption-inducing effect of a larger 
number of tiers appears particularly robust; a larger number of tiers was associated with more frequent 
bribery in almost all the regressions for executive officials. Second, in a way that is intuitively plausible, 
the effects of fiscal and public employment decentralization were strongest in the settings most likely to 
be dominated by subnational officials. Revenue decentralization was negatively related to bribery in 
licensing, utilities, government contracts, and customs/imports. The first two of these very often fall under 
the remit of local officials; government contracts are signed at all levels of government. Only the 
customs/imports result is less expected. The one public activity for which revenue decentralization was 
not significant was tax collection, which is often the responsibility of a centralized agency. Interestingly, 
for tax collection and customs—both matters often controlled by central officials—the frequency of 
bribery was lower when the central government received a larger share of GDP as revenues, arguably 
giving it a stronger incentive to support growth.22 Somewhat surprisingly, for a given distribution of 
public employees across levels, the larger was total government employment, the lower was the reported 
frequency of bribery in for all five types of executive official. Controlling for the number of tiers, bribery 
for certain purposes was less frequent in federal states. We also report the results for bribery in “dealing 
with courts,” although we do not expect the same factors that influence corruption of executive officials 
to necessarily affect judges. This expectation is borne out: except for bottom unit size—larger local units 
were associated with less frequent judicial corruption—the decentralization variables that were significant 
for the executive officials—tiers, fiscal and employment decentralization—had no effect on the courts. 
                                                 
22 Of course, reverse causation is possible here too.  
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This reduces the fear that corruption in all spheres and administrative complexity are both driven by some 
unobserved third factor.  
Finally, in an early version of the paper (Fan, Lin and Treisman, 2008), we conducted a number of 
additional robustness tests. For example, one of the advances of this study is to use an experience-based 
measure of corruption. How do the results differ from those that would be obtained using measures of 
perceived corruption (i.e. the Transparency International Index and World Bank Corruption Control Index) 
as dependent variables? To assess this, Fan, Lin and Treisman (2008) present similar regressions using 
these country-level indexes, and we find that in these regressions too a higher number of tiers was 
associated with more corruption (i.e. a lower value of the indexes) in most models. As in some of the 
WBES regressions, larger bottom unit size was also associated with less corruption (contrary to the 
theoretical expectation). However, neither fiscal decentralization nor decentralization of government 
personnel were significant (which might be due to small sample size). Also, to check that the results are 
not being driven by a few outliers, Fan, Lin and Treisman (2008) presents scatter plots of the 
relationships between the corruption frequency and the main decentralization variables, 
controlling for all the control variables.  
 
6   Conclusion 
Previous studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption, have offered conflicting conclusions 
about how political and fiscal decentralization affect the frequency of bribery in countries around the 
world. Given the complicated, interacting effects that theorists have posited, it seems quite unlikely a 
priori that there exists a simple, general relationship between decentralization and corruption that holds in 
different contexts and geographical settings. We do not suppose this paper will settle the question. Still, 
the data considered here have advantages over those previously analyzed. We examine a large-scale 
survey designed to elicit responses based on the concrete experience of the businessmen interviewed. 
Questions concerned corruption in particular settings as well as in general. We combine this with data on 
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different types of decentralization that are more detailed and specific than those of previous papers, most 
of which have focused on just fiscal decentralization.  
 Among the countries and firms surveyed, several patterns stand out. In countries with a larger 
number of administrative or governmental tiers, reported bribery was both more frequent and more costly 
to firms. Other things equal, in a country with six tiers of government (such as Uganda) the probability 
that firms reported “never” being expected to pay bribes was .32 lower than the same probability in a 
country with two tiers (such as Slovenia). More tiers were associated with more frequent bribery over 
government contracts, connection to public utilities, and customs, but the effect was particularly strong 
for obtaining business licenses and over tax collection. The effect was strongest in developing countries, 
and was not significant in just the richer countries taken separately. As the number of tiers in a country 
gets high, this effect appears to overwhelm some factors otherwise related to the extent of bribery such as 
the size of firms or the country’s religious tradition.  
 Larger subnational bureaucracies were also associated with more frequent and costly bribery among 
the countries in this survey. The effect of higher subnational government employment was especially 
strong among more developed countries and over business licensing and taxation. This was not picking 
up just a general association between bureaucracy and corruption. In fact, given the size of the 
subnational bureaucracy, higher central government (or total) public employment was associated with less 
frequent reported bribery in all five spheres of activity, and especially in the developing countries taken 
separately.   
 Based on the survey examined, reducing the size of the lowest-level local units may also be a bad 
idea. Contrary to arguments that emphasize the disciplining effect of greater factor mobility, smaller local 
units were associated with more frequent and costly corruption, although this result was not robust to 
splitting the sample by income level and was not usually significant when respondents were asked about 
specific spheres of interaction with state officials.  
 By contrast, the responses were consistent with the notion that giving local governments a larger 
stake in locally generated income can reduce their bribe extraction. Other things equal, in a country (such 
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as Finland) in which subnational revenues came to 15 percent of GDP, the probability that firms would 
say they “never” had to make unofficial payments to get things done was .14 higher than in countries 
(such as Luxembourg) where subnational revenues were only 5 percent of GDP. Subnational revenues 
were significant among both more and less developed countries taken separately, but the effect was 
stronger among the richer countries. Where central governments received larger revenues (as a 
percentage of GDP), reported bribery was also less frequent (as one might expect based on the incentive 
argument—central officials should also be motivated by a larger stake in marginal income), but the effect 
was smaller than for subnational revenues. Whereas greater subnational revenues were linked to lower 
corruption in business licensing, government contracts, utilities, and customs administration, larger 
central revenues were associated with less corruption in customs and tax collection, functions that are 
perhaps more often central responsibilities. However, whereas higher central government revenues were 
associated with a smaller reported burden of bribery, higher subnational government revenues were not 
significant. The effect of fiscal decentralization appears to be to reduce the frequency of bribery rather 
than the total cost of paying the bribes. 
 As usual in this sort of empirical study, there are caveats. Although the data we use are more detailed 
and precise than in previous explorations, they are still likely to contain some measurement error. In 
addition, the direction of causation is open to question for all the dimensions of decentralization examined 
but especially for the results concerning fiscal decentralization23. In more corrupt countries, official 
subnational revenues—and central revenues as well—might be lower because agents redirect their effort 
from tax collection to bribe extraction. Where officials are more predatory and less accountable, they 
might choose to create more complex structures of government, increasing the number of tiers, lower tier 
units, and subnational bureaucrats in order to provide benefits for their allies. These types of 
decentralization might also be caused by—rather than causes of—corruption. Lacking any reasonable 
                                                 
23 In our study, the potential problem of endogeneity is much less of a concern than in a pure cross-country analysis 
because we are examining the impact of political decentralization on individual firms. It seems not very likely that 
an individual firm’s view or perception about corruption will influence political decentralization nationwide (Beck 
et al., 2006; Barth et al. 2008). 
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instruments for decentralization, we can suggest plausible interpretations of the patterns in the data, but 
cannot make confident claims about their causes.  
 Recognizing these limitations, the study does quite consistently support one line of argument—that 
which emphasizes the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking when government structures become more 
complex. The more tiers of government and the more local personnel with pockets to fill, the greater the 
danger that the rents of office will be “overgrazed”. Giving governments a greater stake in local income 
may reduce the motivation to extract bribes, although it could be just that more honest officials collect tax 
revenues more effectively, producing the same correlation. How generally applicable such findings are 
will become clearer as they are supplemented by further research examining other experience-based 
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Note: WBES “Frequency of Corruption” is the percentage of respondents saying that firms in their line of 
business had to pay some irregular "additional payments" to get things done “always”, “mostly”, or 




Table 1.   New decentralization variables 
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Table 2.   Correlations between decentralization variables (and ln gdp per capita) 
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Table 3: Description and Sources of Key Variables 
Variable Description Source WBES Countries Missing From Data 
Firm Characteristics and  
Corruption Measures    
Bribe Frequency 
It is common for firms in my line of business 
to have to pay some irregular "additional 
payments" to get things done: (1) never, (2) 
seldom, (3) sometimes. (4) frequently, (5) 
mostly, (6) always. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
Bribe Amount 
On average, what percentage of revenues 
do firms like yours typically pay per year in 
unofficial payments to public officials: (1) 
0%, (2) greater than 0 and  less than 1%, 
(3) 1-1.99%, (4) 2-9.99%, (5) 10-12%, (6) 
13-25%, (7) over 25%. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
Foreign Ownership 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if any foreign 
company or individual has a financial stake 
in the ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
State Ownership 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if any 
government agency or state body has a 
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, 0 
otherwise 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
Exporter Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm exports, 0 otherwise. 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
Firm Size Natural logarithm of firm's sales World Business Environment Survey (WBES)  
Industry Dummies 
A series of dummy variables that represent 
the firms' industries (Manufacturing, 
Construction, Service, Agriculture, and 
Others) 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)  
Political and Fiscal 
Decentralization Measures    
Tiers 
Number of tiers of government.             
A tier is coded as a "tier of government" if 
state executive body at that level  
480 sources, detailed in Fan, Lin 
and Treisman (2008) 
Belize, Cote d'lvoire, West 
Bank-Gaza 
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(1) was funded from the public budget, (2) 
had authority to administer a range of public 
services, and (3) had a territorial jurisdiction.
Federalism 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
country is classified as "federal", 0 
otherwise. 
Elazar (1995) Belize, Cote d'lvoire, West Bank-Gaza 
Bottom Unit Size 
Average size of bottom tier units, thousand 
sq kms (i.e., surface area divided by 
estimated number of bottom tier units) 
480 sources, detailed in Fan, Lin 
and Treisman (2008) 
Belize, Cameroon, China, Cote 
d'lvoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Singapore, Tanzania, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Autonomy  
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if (1) 
constitution reserves decisionmaking on at 
least one topic exclusively to subnational 
legislatures and/or (2) constitution assigns 
to subnational legislatures exclusive right to 
legislate on issues that it does not 
specifically assign to one level of 
government.  
Constitutions of countries in data 
set 
Belize, Botswana, Cameroon,  
Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, 
Tanzania, Ukraine, Uruguay, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Bottom Tier Election 
Variable that takes the value: 1 if executives 
at bottom tier are directly elected or chosen 
by directly elected assembly; 0 if executives 
at bottom tier are appointed by the officials 
in higher tier government unit; 0.5 if some of 
the executives are appointed while some of 
them are elected. 
480 sources, detailed in Fan, Lin 
and Treisman (2008) 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belize, Botswana, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, China, Cote d'lvoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Singapore, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Second Lowest Tier Election 
Variable that takes the value: 1 if executives 
at second lowest tier are directly elected or 
chosen by directly elected assembly; 0 if 
executives at second lowest tier are 
appointed by the officials in higher tier 
government unit; 0.5 if some of the 
executives are appointed while some of 
them are elected.  
480 sources, detailed in Fan, Lin 
and Treisman (2008) 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belize, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cote 
d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
India, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Singapore, 
Slovenia, Thailand, Trinidad Tobago, 




Sub-national revenues (% of GDP), average 
1994-2000, available years, from World 
Bank Decentralization Indicators, 
constructed from IMF GFS 
World Bank Decentralization 
Indicators (2000) 
Bangladesh, Belize, Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
Pakistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Venezuela, West Bank-Gaza 
Subnational government 
employment share: 
 non-central government employment as % 
of total government employment. Schiavo Campo et al. 1997 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, 
Bosnia, Brazil, Cambodia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Czech Rep., 
Dominican Rep., El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, 
Romania, Slovenia, Trinidad Tobago, 
Uzbekistan, West Bank-Gaza 
Total Government Revenues 
Total government revenues (% of GDP), 
average 1994-2000, available years, from 
World Bank Decentralization Indicators, 
constructed from IMF GFS 
World Bank Decentralization 
Indicators (2000) 
Bangladesh, Belize, Bosnia, 
Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Colombia, Cote d'lvoire, Ecuador, 
Egypt,  El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, West Bank-Gaza 
Total Government 
Employment 
Total government employment as a share of 
labor force. Schiavo Campo et al. 1997 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, 
Bosnia, Brazil, Cambodia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Czech Rep., 
Dominican Rep., El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Panama, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, 
Trinidad Tobago, Uzbekistan, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Other Macro Control Variables    
GDP per Capita Natural logarithm of country's GDP per capita in year 1999 WDI 2006 (World Bank)  
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Democratic democratic in all years 1950-2000 Treisman (2000),         Przeworksi et al. (2000) 
Belize, Cote d'lvoire, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Fuel % of mineral fuels in manufacturing exports, 2000 WDI 2006 (World Bank) 
Belize, Bosnia, Cote d'lvoire, 
Dominican Rep, Ethiopia, Haiti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, West 
Bank-Gaza 
Imports imports of goods and services as % of GDP, 2000 WDI 2007 (World Bank) 
Belize, Cote d'lvoire, Singapore, 
West Bank-Gaza 
Protestant Protestant as % of the population  
U.S. State Department Survey 
(2000), as in Barro and McCleary 
(2005) 
 West Bank-Gaza 
British Colony 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
country is a former British colony, 0 
otherwise. 
Treisman (2000), with additional 
information from various sources 









Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Bribe Frequency  9130 2.914  1.683  1 6 
Bribe Amount 5246 2.427  1.542  1 7 
Foreign Ownership 9645 0.122  0.327  0 1 
State Ownership 9673 0.188  0.391  0 1 
Exporter 9463 0.356  0.479  0 1 
Firm Size 9087 9.982  7.803  0 25.328  
Tiers 9785 3.898  0.947  1 6 
Federalism 9785 0.219  0.414  0 1 
Bottom Unit Size 9114 1.739  8.862  0.002  83.143  
Autonomy  8462 0.299  0.458  0 1 
Bottom Tier Election 7858 0.775  0.405  0 1 
Second Lowest Tier 
Election 7032 0.539 0.484 0 1 
Subnational Revenues 
(% of GDP) 7714 6.070  5.128  0 23.418  
Subnational government 
share of public 
employment 
6741 40.132  19.890  0 92.857  
Ln GDP per Capita 9728 8.447  0.938  6.205  10.396  
Democratic 9785 0.126  0.332  0 1 
Fuel 9111 13.973  21.434  0.001  99.635  
Imports (% of GDP) 9685 41.199  19.158  11.519  104.462  
Protestant        
(% of Population) 9932 0.330  0.358  0 0.943 




The countries in the survey are: Albania (3), Argentina(3), Armenia (3), Azerbaijan (3), Bangladesh (5), 
Belarus (4), Bolivia (4), Botswana (3), Brazil (4), Bulgaria (4), Cambodia (4), Cameroon (6), Canada (4), 
Chile (4), China (5), Colombia (3), Costa Rica (4), Croatia (3), Czech Republic (3), Dominican Rep. (3), 
Ecuador (4), Egypt (4.5), El Salvador (3), Estonia (5), France (4), Georgia (4), Germany (4), Ghana (6), 
Guatemala (4), Honduras (3), Hungary (3), India (5), Indonesia (5), Italy (4), Kazakhstan (4), Kenya (6), 
Lithuania (3), Madagascar (5), Malawi (4), Malaysia (3), Mexico (3), Moldova (3), Namibia (3), Nicaragua 
(4), Nigeria (4), Pakistan (4.5), Panama (4), Peru (4), Philippines (4), Poland (3), Portugal (4), Romania (3), 
Russia (4), Senegal (6), Singapore (1), Slovakia (4), Slovenia (2), South Africa (3), Spain (4), Sweden (3), 
Tanzania (6), Thailand (5), Tunisia (4), Turkey (4), UK (4), US (4), Uganda (6), Ukraine (4), Uruguay (2), 
Venezuela (4), Zambia (3) and Zimbabwe (5). Tiers of governments are in parentheses 
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Table 5: Decentralization and Bribe Frequency 
Variable Model Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tiers 0.254 0.263 0.216 0.173 0.108 0.077 0.266 0.334 0.309 0.209 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.043]** [0.152] [0.408] [0.351] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.014]** 
Federal  0.012         
  [0.940]         
Federal X Bottom Unit Size  -0.059         
  [0.654]         
Bottom Unit Size  -0.004 -0.055 -0.192 -0.283     -0.032 
  [0.110] [0.044]** [0.123] [0.066]*     [0.506] 
Autonomy    0.036        
   [0.829]        
Autonomy X Bottom Unit Size   0.05        
   [0.678]        
Local Road Construction    -0.143       
    [0.262]       
Local Road Construction X Bottom 
Unit Size    -0.309       
    [0.035]**       
Local Police     -0.137      
     [0.533]      
Local Police X Bottom Unit Size     -0.239      
     [0.436]      
Bottom Tier Election      0.141     
      [0.268]     
Second Lowest Tier Election      -0.05     
      [0.659]     
Subnational Revenues        -0.025   -0.044 
       [0.034]**   [0.000]***
Total Government Revenues        -0.018   -0.02 
       [0.032]**   [0.028]** 
Subnational Government 
Employment Share        0.005  0.008 
        [0.082]*  [0.032]** 
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Total Government Employees        0.016  -0.035 
        [0.331]  [0.209] 
Subnational Government 
Employment Ratio (% of 
Population) 
        0.124  
         [0.039]**  
Central Government Employment 
Ratio (% of Population)         0.027  
         [0.767]  
State Ownership -0.534 -0.536 -0.558 -0.554 -0.561 -0.587 -0.505 -0.586 -0.597 -0.557 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Foreign Ownership -0.07 -0.065 -0.073 -0.155 -0.16 -0.105 -0.127 -0.1 -0.114 -0.131 
 [0.149] [0.190] [0.179] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.024]** [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]***
Exporter 0.054 0.059 0.068 0.017 0.023 0.037 0.055 0.036 0.026 0.065 
 [0.155] [0.119] [0.106] [0.658] [0.563] [0.297] [0.064]* [0.269] [0.469] [0.031]** 
Firm Size -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.016 -0.02 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 
 [0.284] [0.323] [0.662] [0.803] [0.842] [0.034]** [0.003]*** [0.432] [0.432] [0.049]** 
GDP per Capita -0.291 -0.277 -0.349 -0.414 -0.395 -0.35 -0.105 -0.317 -0.32 -0.131 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.007]*** [0.000]*** [0.205] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.217] 
Democratic 0.006 -0.026 -0.066 0.044 -0.015 0.016 0.031 -0.191 -0.141 0.19 
 [0.967] [0.879] [0.702] [0.804] [0.938] [0.936] [0.864] [0.297] [0.467] [0.351] 
Fuel 0.0005 0.0001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 
 [0.833] [0.974] [0.614] [0.722] [0.626] [0.989] [0.913] [0.253] [0.292] [0.518] 
Imports 0.0004 0.000 0.0002 0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.902] [0.996] [0.961] [0.237] [0.467] [0.127] [0.907] [0.742] [0.658] [0.537] 
Protestant -0.864 -0.906 -0.653 -0.369 -0.347 -0.376 -0.036 -0.814 -0.285 0.409 
 [0.037]** [0.032]** [0.163] [0.378] [0.381] [0.506] [0.931] [0.116] [0.581] [0.378] 
British Colony -0.028 -0.011 -0.074 -0.19 -0.125 0.17 -0.155 -0.118 -0.15 -0.257 
 [0.825] [0.929] [0.588] [0.319] [0.503] [0.405] [0.294] [0.545] [0.356] [0.202] 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of Countries 67 63 54 30 30 50 47 48 48 34 
Observations 6676 6527 5820 3499 3499 4775 5270 4998 4979 4101 
Regressions run with ordered probit, based on standard maximum likelihood estimation, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values based on robust 
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6: Decentralization and Bribe Amount 
Variable 
Model Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tiers 0.462 0.401 0.319 0.291 0.317 0.234 0.332 0.616 0.609 0.560 
 [0.000]*** [0.008]*** [0.014]** [0.075]* [0.088]* [0.171] [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Federal  0.085         
  [0.789]         
Federal X Bottom Unit Size  -0.009         
  [0.966]         
Bottom Unit Size  -0.097 -0.462 -0.316 -0.265     -0.069 
  [0.225] [0.004]*** [0.135] [0.146]     [0.474] 
Autonomy    -0.033        
   [0.914]        
Autonomy X Bottom Unit Size   0.342        
   [0.118]        
Local Road Construction    -0.159       
    [0.529]       
Local Road Construction X 
Bottom Unit Size    -0.058       
    [0.818]       
Local Police     0.331      
     [0.340]      
Local Police X Bottom Unit 
Size     -0.482      
     [0.276]      
Bottom Tier Election      0.012     
      [0.946]     
Second Lowest Tier Election      0.033     
      [0.835]     
Subnational Revenues        0.018    
       [0.304]    
Total Government Revenues        -0.036    
       [0.001]***    
Subnational Government 
Employment Share        0.008  0.007 
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        [0.060]*  [0.093]* 
Total Government Employees        -0.004  -0.003 
        [0.903]  [0.926] 
Subnational Government 
Employment Ratio         0.168  
(% of Population)         [0.129]  
Central Government 
Employment Ratio         -0.009  
(% of Population)         [0.919]  
State Ownership -0.152 -0.165 -0.198 -0.258 -0.272 -0.187 -0.155 -0.249 -0.237 -0.258 
 [0.016]** [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.019]** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]***
Foreign Ownership -0.062 -0.067 -0.106 -0.15 -0.153 -0.093 -0.158 -0.104 -0.139 -0.109 
 [0.367] [0.323] [0.170] [0.083]* [0.076]* [0.215] [0.042]** [0.172] [0.075]* [0.157] 
Exporter 0.071 0.074 0.096 -0.001 0.003 -0.019 0.032 -0.001 0 0.001 
 [0.261] [0.241] [0.228] [0.987] [0.957] [0.712] [0.569] [0.979] [0.994] [0.979] 
Firm Size -0.066 -0.061 -0.05 -0.044 -0.037 -0.077 -0.073 -0.062 -0.062 -0.058 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
GDP per Capita -0.319 -0.317 -0.351 -0.513 -0.611 -0.549 -0.149 -0.521 -0.552 -0.503 
 [0.009]*** [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.097]* [0.064]* [0.000]*** [0.329] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]***
Democratic -0.217 -0.232 -0.353 -0.144 -0.245 -0.024 -0.262 -0.434 -0.664 -0.471 
 [0.484] [0.439] [0.264] [0.779] [0.669] [0.934] [0.337] [0.317] [0.121] [0.293] 
Fuel 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 [0.199] [0.151] [0.230] [0.090]* [0.074]* [0.282] [0.427] [0.760] [0.584] [0.561] 
Imports 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.004 
 [0.335] [0.386] [0.539] [0.089]* [0.199] [0.760] [0.114] [0.433] [0.558] [0.475] 
Protestant -0.228 -0.302 0.347 1.742 2.252 0.537 0.397 0.732 2.834 0.742 
 [0.796] [0.726] [0.666] [0.057]* [0.057]* [0.640] [0.644] [0.461] [0.002]*** [0.447] 
British Colony 0.132 0.102 -0.007 0.071 0.038 0.338 -0.202 0.008 -0.024 0.053 
 [0.584] [0.702] [0.979] [0.820] [0.892] [0.452] [0.588] [0.984] [0.905] [0.890] 
Industry Dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Number of Countries 51 51 43 25 25 40 40 36 36 36 
Observations 4102 4102 3559 2221 2221 3019 3195 2950 2910 2950 
Regressions run with ordered probit, based on standard maximum likelihood estimation, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values based on robust 
standard errors in parentheses.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Never Seldom Sometimes Frequently Mostly  Always 
Tiers 
1 standard deviation 
increase -0.0513 -0.0102 0.0013  0.0160 0.0243 0.0198 
Marginal Effect -0.0675 -0.0134 0.0017  0.0212 0.0321 0.0260 
Subnational 
Revenue 
1 standard deviation 
increase 0.0771 0.0152 -0.0019  -0.0240 -0.0366 -0.0298 




1 standard deviation 
increase -0.0455 -0.0090 0.0011  0.0142 0.0216 0.0175 
Marginal Effect -0.0026 -0.0005 0.0001  0.0008 0.0013 0.0010 
State Ownership from 0 to 1 0.2050 0.0143 -0.0354  -0.0662 -0.0730 -0.0447 
Foreign Ownership from 0 to 1 0.0438 0.0073 -0.0029  -0.0141 -0.0195 -0.0146 
 
Note: Figures in the table indicate the change in probability of a firm giving this answer associated with the indicated change in the value of the 


















Table 8: Decentralization and Bribe Frequency in Different Sub-Samples 
Variable 
Model Specifications 
More Developed Countries Less Developed Countries More Corrupt Countries Less Corrupt Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tiers 0.075 -0.023 0.025 0.303 0.301 0.179 0.197 0.206 0.242 0.086 -0.171 0.146 
 [0.442] [0.866] [0.828] [0.002]*** [0.048]** [0.004]*** [0.014]** [0.055]* [0.000]*** [0.271] [0.167] [0.320] 
Autonomy   0.223   0.858   0.704   0.719  
  [0.415]   [0.021]**   [0.000]***   [0.000]***  
Autonomy X 
Bottom Unit Size  0.256   -0.166   -0.582   -0.352  
  [0.358]   [0.281]   [0.000]***  ` [0.013]**  
Bottom Unit Size  -0.29   -0.016   -0.0003   -0.033  
  [0.011]**   [0.633]   [0.990]   [0.316]  
Subnational 
Revenues    -0.097   -0.068   -0.081   -0.075 
   [0.000]***   [0.000]***   [0.000]***   [0.000]*** 
Total Government 
Revenues    -0.006   -0.024   0.002   0.006 
   [0.470]   [0.001]***   [0.593]   [0.605] 
Subnational 
Government 
Employment Share   0.031   0.01   0.013   0.02 
   [0.000]***   [0.000]***   [0.000]***   [0.005]*** 
Total Government 
Employees   0.032   -0.127   -0.105   -0.021 
   [0.209]   [0.000]***   [0.000]***   [0.341] 
State Ownership -0.477 -0.513 -0.369 -0.604 -0.65 -0.679 -0.547 -0.587 -0.598 -0.516 -0.538 -0.471 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Foreign Ownership -0.197 -0.187 -0.127 0.019 0.037 -0.1 -0.028 -0.034 -0.128 -0.132 -0.094 -0.098 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.088]* [0.779] [0.650] [0.024]** [0.700] [0.668] [0.010]** [0.038]** [0.154] [0.200] 
Exporter 0.011 0.03 0.054 0.003 0.019 0.061 0.042 0.063 0.059 -0.01 -0.022 0.032 
 [0.799] [0.466] [0.247] [0.959] [0.785] [0.136] [0.482] [0.307] [0.094]* [0.825] [0.659] [0.518] 
Firm Size -0.027 -0.026 -0.037 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 0.002 0.006 -0.004 -0.034 -0.03 -0.043 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.626] [0.819] [0.118] [0.758] [0.449] [0.419] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
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GDP per Capita -0.393 -0.446 -0.129 -0.174 -0.119 -0.036 -0.067 0.004 -0.045 -0.297 -0.666 -0.054 
 [0.005]*** [0.015]** [0.738] [0.167] [0.332] [0.642] [0.320] [0.957] [0.293] [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.782] 
Democratic 0.293 0.229 0.695 -0.173 -0.731 -0.186 -0.123 -0.455 -0.023 0.071 0.178 0.236 
 [0.123] [0.168] [0.003]*** [0.344] [0.032]** [0.293] [0.326] [0.000]*** [0.855] [0.666] [0.265] [0.215] 
Fuel -0.006 -0.009 0.032 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.025 -0.006 -0.011 0.018 
 [0.003]*** [0.006]*** [0.000]*** [0.604] [0.329] [0.000]*** [0.289] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.010]** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
Imports -0.001 -0.001 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 
 [0.534] [0.629] [0.003]*** [0.626] [0.630] [0.465] [0.639] [0.567] [0.000]*** [0.141] [0.807] [0.359] 
Protestant -0.772 -0.443 -1.034 -1.12 -0.327 -0.544 -0.754 0.066 0.25 -0.286 -0.407 0.326 
 [0.232] [0.362] [0.127] [0.020]** [0.643] [0.416] [0.171] [0.911] [0.482] [0.590] [0.430] [0.591] 
British Colony -0.014 -0.118 0.047 0.06 -0.289 -0.256 0.048 -0.342 -0.88 0.161 0.261 0.303 
 [0.949] [0.635] [0.818] [0.734] [0.269] [0.083]* [0.775] [0.017]** [0.000]*** [0.430] [0.210] [0.257] 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of 
Countries 29 26 18 38 28 17 33 26 17 34 28 18 
Observations 3099 2922 2123 3577 2898 2033 3233 2742 1937 3443 3078 2219 
Regressions run with ordered probit, based on standard maximum likelihood estimation, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
country. Detailed variable definitions and sources in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. More developed countries are those with GDP per capita above the sample’s median, 
$5,995. Less developed countries are those with GDP per capita below the median.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tiers 0.115 0.12 0.101 0.032 0.115 0.146 0.138 0.086 
 [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.039]** [0.287] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.013]** 
Federal  -0.038       
  [0.513]       
Federal X Bottom Unit Size  -0.007       
  [0.856]       
Bottom Unit Size  -0.002 -0.024     -0.019 
  [0.054]* [0.023]**     [0.364] 
Autonomy    -0.03      
   [0.628]      
Autonomy X Bottom Unit Size   0.03      
   [0.427]      
Bottom Tier Election    0.045     
    [0.258]     
Second Lowest Tier Election    -0.006     
    [0.881]     
Subnational Revenues      -0.008   -0.012 
     [0.054]*   [0.002]***
Total Government Revenues      -0.008   -0.01 
     [0.026]**   [0.012]** 
Subnational Government Employment Share      0.002  0.003 
      [0.065]*  [0.023]** 
Total Government Employees      0.007  -0.016 
      [0.225]  [0.170] 
Subnational Government Employment Ratio (% 
of Population)       0.049  
       [0.036]**  
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Central Government Employment Ratio (% of 
Population)       0.006  
       [0.834]  
State Ownership -0.168 -0.167 -0.17 -0.165 -0.162 -0.196 -0.201 -0.186 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Foreign Ownership -0.031 -0.025 -0.031 -0.048 -0.047 -0.048 -0.048 -0.058 
 [0.133] [0.229] [0.175] [0.017]** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.002]***
Exporter 0.021 0.017 0.02 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.022 
 [0.229] [0.325] [0.316] [0.587] [0.256] [0.617] [0.709] [0.184] 
Firm Size -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 [0.668] [0.599] [0.958] [0.067]* [0.025]** [0.901] [0.941] [0.340] 
GDP per Capita -0.098 -0.087 -0.112 -0.115 -0.024 -0.119 -0.116 -0.03 
 [0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.531] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.494] 
Democratic -0.056 -0.063 -0.07 -0.06 -0.053 -0.1 -0.087 0.02 
 [0.339] [0.325] [0.280] [0.342] [0.470] [0.126] [0.221] [0.786] 
Fuel 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0003 
 [0.864] [0.993] [0.799] [0.692] [0.637] [0.141] [0.137] [0.863] 
Imports 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.942] [0.676] [0.745] [0.039]** [0.909] [0.807] [0.696] [0.586] 
Protestant -0.315 -0.343 -0.225 -0.102 -0.056 -0.39 -0.282 0.048 
 [0.095]* [0.079]* [0.271] [0.561] [0.746] [0.047]** [0.219] [0.777] 
British Colony -0.003 0.013 -0.008 0.092 -0.045 -0.062 -0.059 -0.101 
 [0.946] [0.797] [0.894] [0.166] [0.372] [0.321] [0.286] [0.123] 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of Countries 67 63 54 50 47 48 48 34 
Observations 6676 6527 5820 4775 5270 4998 4979 4101 
The regressions are run with probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Furthermore, 
we allow for clustering within countries to allow for possible correlation of errors in all the models. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the 
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the probit regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the 
discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
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Table 10: Decentralization and Reported Frequency of Bribery for Particular Purposes 
Variables Business Licenses Tax Collection Government Contract Public Utilities Customs Courts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tiers 0.188 0.152 0.22 0.148 0.148 0.089 0.128 0.059 0.161 0.057 0.025 -0.05 
 [0.004]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.038]** [0.055]* [0.084]* [0.068]* [0.314] [0.026]** [0.411] [0.823] [0.748] 
Federal -0.109  -0.069  -0.351  -0.303  -0.452  -0.105  
 [0.581]  [0.726]  [0.064]*  [0.091]*  [0.028]**  [0.574]  
Federal  X  
Bottom Unit Size -0.104  0.028  -0.034  -0.128  0.044  -0.032  
 [0.450]  [0.828]  [0.784]  [0.361]  [0.753]  [0.811]  
Bottom Unit Size -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  -0.007  -0.15  
 [0.358]  [0.267]  [0.132]  [0.275]  [0.021]**  [0.037]**  
Subnational 
Revenues   -0.047  -0.016  -0.042  -0.033  -0.044  -0.034 
  [0.000]***  [0.238]  [0.006]***  [0.007]***  [0.000]***  [0.111] 
Total Government 
Revenues   -0.012  -0.025  -0.003  -0.007  -0.024  -0.012 
  [0.098]*  [0.022]**  [0.701]  [0.385]  [0.008]***  [0.329] 
Subnational  Govt. 
Employment Share  0.009  0.006  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.004 
  [0.000]***  [0.045]**  [0.548]  [0.564]  [0.792]  [0.234] 
Total Government 
Employees   -0.102  -0.063  -0.07  -0.079  -0.1  -0.111 
  [0.000]***  [0.067]*  [0.003]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
State Ownership -0.546 -0.576 -0.498 -0.496 -0.4 -0.417 -0.542 -0.544 -0.453 -0.428 -0.334 -0.384 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Foreign Ownership 0.028 -0.009 -0.083 -0.069 -0.011 -0.044 0.034 -0.002 0.121 0.127 0.093 -0.042 
 [0.583] [0.875] [0.155] [0.324] [0.861] [0.541] [0.586] [0.979] [0.031]** [0.080]* [0.195] [0.689] 
Exporter 0.094 0.14 0.095 0.12 0.261 0.283 0.002 -0.012 0.408 0.402 0.089 0.168 
 [0.076]* [0.026]** [0.029]** [0.024]** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.975] [0.872] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.106] [0.009]*** 
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Firm Size -0.056 -0.056 -0.042 -0.042 -0.07 -0.072 -0.057 -0.07 -0.057 -0.071 -0.064 -0.08 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.293 -0.247 -0.467 -0.292 -0.227 -0.07 -0.416 -0.306 -0.386 -0.068 -0.231 -0.173 
 [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.005]*** [0.023]** [0.439] [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.480] [0.010]** [0.098]* 
Democratic 0.119 0.602 0.122 0.229 -0.083 -0.053 0.223 0.337 0.142 0.259 -0.265 0.419 
 [0.529] [0.004]*** [0.553] [0.320] [0.683] [0.768] [0.158] [0.147] [0.469] [0.320] [0.375] [0.372] 
Fuel 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 0 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 
 [0.773] [0.322] [0.752] [0.737] [0.450] [0.040]** [0.420] [0.501] [0.955] [0.167] [0.349] [0.241] 
Imports -0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 0 -0.008 -0.008 
 [0.082]* [0.760] [0.107] [0.665] [0.007]*** [0.101] [0.031]** [0.196] [0.033]** [0.989] [0.035]** [0.020]** 
Protestant -0.22 1.085 -0.815 -0.182 0.143 0.497 -0.564 0.683 -0.325 0.567 0.331 1.744 
 [0.694] [0.049]** [0.092]* [0.668] [0.802] [0.363] [0.253] [0.289] [0.521] [0.453] [0.679] [0.141] 
British Colony 0.105 -0.322 -0.015 -0.182 0.444 0.511 0.674 0.598 0.335 0.409 -0.344 0.107 
 [0.593] [0.125] [0.940] [0.404] [0.052]* [0.013]** [0.000]*** [0.047]** [0.081]* [0.208] [0.202] [0.823] 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of Countries 61 34 61 34 61 34 61 34 61 34 49 27 
Observations 5809 3690 5780 3674 5450 3406 5889 3751 5391 3394 4874 3025 
 
Regressions run with ordered probit, based on standard maximum likelihood estimation, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values based on robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
